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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DEATH-DENIAL OF PUNITIVE
WRONGFUL DEATH VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION.

DAMAGES

FOR

On March 3, 1974, shortly after takeoff from Paris, France, a

Douglas DC-10 passenger airplane owned and operated by Turkish
Air Lines crashed, killing all on board.' As a result, 203 law suits
involving 337 decedents were pending in California federal district
court 2 seeking compensatory and punitive damages for wrongful
death. California state courts, however, have repeatedly denied punitive damages in wrongful death actions.3 Because federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship, as well as on other
grounds 4 the federal district court would have had to apply California state law and thus deny punitive damages.5 Three of the
four defendants 6 agreed to settle out of court if the punitive damages claim was waived, 7 but the claimants brought a pretrial motion to challenge the constitutional validity of denying such punitive damages. Plaintiffs argued that allowing punitive damages
for all other tort actions but not for the wrongful death of a human
being was contrary to the uniform application of the laws required
by the state constitution as well as by the equal protection provisions
of the federal constitution." The federal district court held that deny1. The 346 killed Included 13 crew members. In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974.
399 F. Supp. 732, 735 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
2. Of these suits, 191 were initiated in the Central District of California, while 10
were transferred from other districts for a multi-district litigation permitted by 28 U.S.C.
§ 14.07 (1970). 399 F. Supp. at 736. The two other suits involved property damage.
3. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551
P.2d 334 (1976); Pease v. Beach Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416
(1974); Doak v. Superior Court, 257 Cal. App. 2d 825, 65 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1968); Fox
V. Oakland Con. St. Ry., 118 Cal. 55, 50 P. 25 (1897) ; Lange v. Schoettler, 115 Cal. 388,
47 P. 139 (1896).
4. The United States District Court claimed Jurisdiction because of its overriding interest in the design and manufacture of aircraft and because all of the acts or failures
to act were claimed to have occurred in California. California law governed under 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (1970). Ia re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 749 (C.D.
Cal. 1975).
5. A federal court basing its jurisdiction upon diversity of citizenship must apply the
law of the forum state as interpreted by the appellate courts of that state. Erie Ry. Co.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
6. The three defendants were McDonnel Douglas Corp., Turk Hava, Yallari A.O., and
General Dynamics, Inc. The claims against them were based upon products liability. The
United States was the fourth defendant. Its alleged liability was based on issuing a certificate of airworthiness. i re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D.
Cal 1975).
7. Plaintiffs who would not waive them would have to litigate both liability and
damages. Such a litigation would necessarily involve the United States as one of the defendants, against whom no punitive damages could be recovereld. Id. at 738. Because of
little progress in settlement, the trial judge granted separate trials under FED. R. Civ. P.
42 for suits against McDonnel Douglas and General Dynamics, and ordered that products
liability issues be consolidated and that pre-trial discovery be commenced on the issue of
punitive damages. In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 69 F.R.D. 310 (1975).
8. In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 410 F. Supp. 326 (C.D. Cal. 1976). Approximately one half of the claimants had by this time arrived at an agreed settlement figure
for compensatory damages, having waived all claims for punitive damages. The trial
judge, for reasons of comity with the California courts, where the constitutional questions
were being raised for the first time in Rosendin v. Avco Corp., No. 32999 (Ct. App. Cal.,
filed March 25, 1976), deferred any ruling until the state court had an opportunity to rule
on the question then pen:ling before It. 410 F. Supp. at 329. Furthermore, the judge held
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ing punitive damages in actions for wrongful death had no rational
basis and thus violated the equal protection provisions of both the
California and United States Constitutions. In re Paris Air Crash of
March 3, 1974, 427 F. Supp. 701 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
The common law did not recognize a wrongfully inflicted death
as giving rise to a civil action to recover damages. Such a personal
right of action was said to have died with the person." That was
changed in the mid-nineteenth century by what is now commonly
known as Lord Campbell's Act. 10 That Act created a cause of action
in favor of the personal representative of the deceased for the benefit
of a certain class of persons for loss sustained by them through such
wrongful death under circumstances which would have supported an
action by the deceased, had he survived. 1 Today every American
state has a statutory remedy for wrongful death.1 2 Most of the states
have modeled their statutes after Lord Campbell's Act.13 The remaining states have provided a remedy for wrongful death through their
4
survival statutes.1
The measure of damages for wrongfully causing a person's death
depends solely on the interpretation of the statute granting the wrongful death remedy.' 5 Among the statutes modeled after Lord Campbell's Act, there is a general consensus that the damages recoverable
by decedent's beneficiaries are measured by their pecuniary loss as
a result of his death. 16 Because punitive damages are generally not
that deciding the question then was unnecessary, because there had not yet been a factual
finding of oppression, fraud, or malice. Id.
After renewed motions, and after it became apparent that the constitutional issues
would not be decided by the California courts, the federal district court considered itself
compelled to decide the issues brought before it. In 7e Paris Air Crash of March .3, 1974,
427 F. Supp. 701 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
9. E.g., Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808). See also F. HARPER,
LAW OF TORTS § 279 (1933) ; W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 127 (4th ed. 1971).
10. Fatal Accidents Act, 9 & 10 Vict. 217, c. 93 (1846).
11. See F. HARPER, LAW OF TORTS § 279 (1933). Upon decedent's death, wrongful death
statutes create a new cause of action, the purpose of which is to compensate the heirs of
a decedent for losses they have sustained as a result of the decedent's death. Survival
statutes, on the other hand, do not create a new cause of action. They continue the decedent's cause of action in order to allow recovery by the personal representative for the
benefit of the decedent's estate of damages the decedent himself might have recovered had
he survived. S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 14.1 (1966).
12. AV. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 127 (4th ed. 1971).
Cum. Supp.
13. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 573.02 (West 1947), as amended, (Vest
1976) ; MONT. REV. CODES AN,. § 9,3-210 (1964); N.D. CE'r. CODE H3 32-21-01 to 03
(1976) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 895.03-b.4 (XVest 196(;), as amended, (\Vest Cum. Supp. 1977).
14. Those statutes, which l)reserve the cause of action which vested in the deceased at
the moment of the wrong, and include the damages which resulted from the death, are as
follows: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-555 (West 1960), as amended, (Vest Cum. Supp.
1976) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 611.20 (West 1950) ; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. H§ 556:12-:14 (1974) ;
S.C. CODE §§ 10-1951 to 10-1954 (1962) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-607 (1955), as amended,
(Cum.Supp. 1976).
15. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § )25 (1939).
16. See F. TIFFANY, )EATH BY WRONGFUL ACT (2nd ed. 1893). The California court had
construed its wrongful death statute to provide for only three basic elements of damages:
(1) The present value of future contributions from the decedent to his surthe Value of any personal service, advice or training that
viving heirs; (2)
the value of the decedent's society
probably would have been given; and (3)
and companionship.
Carr v. Pac. Tel. Co., 26 Cal. App. 3d 537, 545 ; 103 Cal. Rptr. 120, 126 (1972). For a
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designed to compensate a pecuniary loss, but are awarded over and
above compensatory damages,1 it has commonly been held that
they may not be recovered in wrongful death actions.' s
While an increasing number of jurisdictions now allow the recovery of punitive damages in wrongful death cases, either by express
statutory language". or by judicial interpretation of their statutes2 0
the majority of states continue to deny the recovery of punitive
damages in wrongful death actions while allowing them in other tort
actions.2 11 One rationale- employed by the proponents of this latter
position is that because no right to recover for wrongful death exdiscussion of the damages available under wrongful death statutes throughout the United
States, see Comment, Wrongful Death Damages in North Carolina, 44, N.C.L. REV. 402
(1966).
17. Punitive damages, also known as exemplary damages, smart money, or vindictive
damages, are awarded to a plaintiff on a finding of malicious, fraudulent, willful, wanton,
or reckless conduct by a defendant, and generally for the purpose of punishing the 'lefendant and deterring others from following his example. H. OLECK, DAMAGES TO PERSONS
AND PROPERTY § 29 (1961) ; C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 77 (1935).
There has been some criticism that punitive damages accomplish their theoreti'al
goals of punishment and deterrence badly. See, e.g., Willis, The Measure of Damages
When Property is Taken by a Private TIdividual, 22 HARV. L. REV. 419 (1909); Note,
The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive 'Damages, 41
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1158 (1966).
18. See note 21 infra. and cases cited therein. This continues to be the majority position. Although punitive damages are usually not awarded under wrongful death acts,
they are commonly available under survival statutes. E.g., Atlas Properties, Inc. v. Didich,
226 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1969) ; Kern v. Kogan, 93 N.J. Super. 459, 226 A.2d 186 (1967).
19. Those wrongful death statutes which expressly allow for punitive damages are qs
follows: KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.130[6] (Baldwin 1977): MASS. GFN. LAWS ANN. ch.
229, § 2C (West 1958), as amended, (West Cum. Supp. 1977) : Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.080
Supp. 1976) : NEv. REV. STAT. § 41.080 (1973) ;
(Vernon Curi.
(Vernon 1953), as atended,
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-20-1 (1954) ; N.C. GFN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1966), as amended,
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4671
(1962);
10-1951
§
(Cum. Supp. 1975); S.C. CODE
(Vernon Cum. Supp. 1976)
20. The following decisions have allowed punitive damages in wrongful death actions:
(all damages bsed
Blount Bros. Constr. Co. v. Rose, 274 Ala. 429, 149 So. 2d 821 (1962).
upon degree of culpability of wrongdoer) ; Boies v. Cole, 99 Ariz. 198, 407 P.2d 917 (1965) :
Mode v. Barnett, 235 Ark. 641, 361 S.WV.2d 525 (1962) : Broughel v. S. New England' Tel.
(dictum) ; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Fuller,
, 48 A. 751, 753 (1901)
Co., 73 Conn. 614, 106 Miss. 65, 63 So. 265 (1913) ; Olsen v. Montana Ore Purchasing Co., 35 Mont. 400, 89
175
N.W. 559 (1919); Pratt v. Duck, 28
372,
S.D.
42
Scott,
v.
731 (1907); Moberg
P.
Tenn. App. 502, 191 S.W.2d 562 (1945); Turner v. Norfolk & W.R. Co., 40 WV. Va. 675.
22 S.E. 83 (1895).
21. Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington reject punitive damages In
all tort actions unless granted by the statute. C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 78 (1935). Thus
an equal protection argument would not be applicable in those states. See notes 44 and
48 infra., and text accompanying.
Punitive damages for wrongful death actions have been barred by the following decisions: Linge's Adm'r. v. Alaska Treadwell Co., 3 Alaska 9 (1906) ; Moffit v. Tenney, 17
Colo. 189, 30 P. 348 (1892) ; Reynolds v. Willis, 209 A.2d 760 (Del. 1965) ; Fla. E. Coast
By. Co. v. McRoberts, 111 Fla. 278, 149 So. 631 (1933); Baird v. Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy R.R. Co., 11 111. App. 3d 264, 296 N.E.2d 365 (1973) ; Armbruster v'. Chicago, R.I.
& P. Ry. Co. v. Townsend, 71 Kan. 524, 81 P. 205 (1905) ; McKay v. New England Dredging Co., 92 Me. 454, 43 A. 29 (1899) ; London Guar. & Accident Co. v. Bal owan S.S. Co.,
161 Md. 145, 155 A. 334 (1931) : Currie v. Fiting, 375 Mich. 440, 134 N.W.2d 611 (1965) :
Hutchins v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., 44 Minn. 5, 46 N.V. 79 (1890) : Kern v. Kogan,
93 N.J. Super. 459, 226 A.2d 186 (1967): Barret v. State, 85 Misc. 2d 456, 378 N.Y.S.2d
946 (1976) ; Hyyti v. Smith, 67 N.D. 425, 272 N.W. 747 (1937) ; Cincinnati St. By. Co. v.
Altemeier, 60 Ohio St. 10, 53 N.E. 300 (1899) : Crossett v. Andrews, 277 P.2d 117 (Okla.
1954) ; Holmes v. Ore. & Cal. Ry. Co., 5 F. 523 (D. Ore. 1881) : Palmer v. Philadelphia,
B. & W.R. Co., 218 Pa. 114, 66 A. 1127 (1907) ; Platis v. United States, 2,8 F. Supp. 254
(D. Utah 1968,), aff'd 409 F.2d 1009 (10th Cir. 1969) ; Wilson v. Whittaker, 207 Va. 1032,
154 S.E.2d 124 (1967) ; Prange v. Rognstad, 205 Wis. 62, 236 N.W. 650 (1931).
Two wrongful death statutes expressly deny punitive damages. IDAHO CODE § 5-327
(1948), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1977) : R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-8 (1970).
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isted at common law, the right being purely statutory, the statutory
language is subject to strict construction. Thus no damages may be
recovered which are not provided for by the statute.2 - Some jurisdictions that deny the recovery of punitive damages have used the
rationale that because a new cause of action is created, the personal
right of action for punitive damages terminates at death. 23 Other
jurisdictions have denied the recovery of punitive damages in wrongful death cases on the ground that it is not the purpose of their
2
wrongful death statute to punish the wrongdoer. '
The Paris Air Crash court was the first court to consider the
constitutional validity of denying the recovery of punitive damages in
wrongful death actions.' Because California's wrongful death statute does not deny punitive damages on its face,-" ' it was the interpretation given the statute by the courts which was challenged on state
7
and federal equal protection grounds.2
Stated generally, equal protection under the law guarantees that
legislation will affect all equally, unless there is a valid state purpose
in treating one class of persons unequally, and the classification
2
furthers that purpose to some degree. s
,In determining whether a particular state action denies the right
to equal protection under the law, both state and federal courts have
generally adhered to a two-tiered system -of review.2 9 Statutory
classifications infringing on so-called "fundamental" rights,30 or dis22. Comment, Punitive Damages in Wrongful Death, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 301, 304
(1917). E.g., Estrow v. Wilson, 30 App. Dix. 2d 646, 291 N. Y.S.2d 46 (1968).
23. Comment, Punitive Damiages in Wrongful Death, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 301, 304
(1971).
24. Id. at 304-05.
25. In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 427 F. Supp. 701, 704 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
It also appears that this is the first case in the United Stat's to consider such an argunient. At least one legal commentator, however, had suggested the constitutional aspects
in Wroigpil Death Actions, 0
of the issue. See McClelland & Truett, Punitive Daiages
U.S.F.L. REv. 585 (1974.).
26. CAL. CIv. PROC. § 377 (West 1973) provides in part as follows:
When the death of a person . . . is caused hy the wrongful act or neglect
of another, his heirs, and his dependent parents, if an., who are not heirs,
or personal representatives on their behalf may maintain an action . . . under
this section, such damages ma-y be given as under all the circumstances of
the case, may be just, hut shall not include damages recoverable under section 573 of the Probnte Code ...
CAL. PROB. CODE § 573 (West 1956), as (tmeled, (West Supp. 1977) is addressed to survival of actions and not to exemplary damages as a remedy. In re Paris Air Crash of
March 3, 1974, 427 F. Supp. 701, 705 n. 6 (C.D. Cal. 1977). Of those jurisdictions that
deny punitive damages in wrongful death actions, only Idaho and Rhode Island have
note 20.
denied them explicitly by statute. Spra
27. In. re Paris Air Crash of -Marsh 2, 1974, 427 F. Supp. 701, 705 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
on were CAL.. CONST. art. 1, § 7(a), which is
relied
The state constitutional provisions
the general due process and equal protection provision analagous to U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1, and CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 16(a), which provides ;as follo"s: "All laws of a
general nature have uniform operation." 427 F. Supp. at 70S.
25. It. at 707.
l thfe
29. See geuerally Wilkinson, The Supreme Coutrt, the Eqiiat Protection. Cl(ase,
of Constitutional Eqruality, 61 VA. L. REv. 945 (1975).
Three Facs
30. Among those rights recognized as fundamental are the right to vote, the right to
interstatc travel, and tie right to freedom of association. Id. at 951.
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criminating against a "suspect" class, such as race, 31 have been
subject to the strictest judicial scrutiny. Those classifications must
be shown to serve a "compelling state interest" or they will not be
allowed to stand.32 All other classification considerations, that is,
those dealing with economic or social legislation, have been judged
under a "rational basis" standard which merely requires the statutory classification to have some relation to the purpose for which
it was enacted. 3 3 The constitution is offended if the classification
rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of a valid
4
state objective.3
As a result of its reluctance to declare sex a suspect classification, the United States Supreme Court has created a third equal protection test to accommodate issues involving sex discrimination. 3
This test demands less than the strict scrutiny test, but considerably
more than the rational basis test. Under this third test, the constitutionality of a classification is determined by looking at whether it
"serve[s] important governmental objectives . . . [and ' 3is] . .
substantially related to achievement of those objectives. 1
The Paris Air Crash court stated that the denial of the recovery
of punitive damages in wrongful death actions should not be analyzed under the rational basis test, as are economic regulations,7
simply because such damages are measured in monetary recovery.
On the other hand, analysis under the strict scrutiny test would not
be appropriate because the right to punitive damages is not a recognized fundamental right.'"
The court in Paris Air Crash noted, however, that the public's
right to be free from a recurrence of willful, oppressive, or malicious
conduct by a tortfeasor 9 is a personal protection, substantially
31. Alienage and national origin have also been recognized as suspect classes. Id.
32. Id. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) ; Harper v. Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966)
33. See, e.g., N.D. State Rd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156
(1973) ; Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) ; Railway Express Agency %,
N.Y., 336 U.S. 106 (1949). Early statements of the basic standard indicated it required
a "fair and substantial" relation to a valid sta-te objective, Royster Guano Co. v. Va.,
but modern statements of the test have omitted the phrase "fair
253 U.S. 412 (1920),
But see Brown. v.
and substantial". E.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 506 P.2d 212 (1973), where the phrase "fair
and substantial" was used in striking down a guest statute on both state and federal
grounds, even though the rational basis test was used.
34. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961). The leniency of this test is illustrated by the fact that not since Morey v. Doud, 359 U.S. 457 (1957), has the United
States Supreme Court struck down social or economic legislation on equal protection
grounds.
35. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971).
, 97 S. Ct. 451, 457 (1976) (emphasis added).
36. Craig v. Boren, 426 U.S. 903, 37. Analogously, the award' of damages in a civil rights case would not place the right
of economic legislation. In ye Paris Air Crash
in
the
area
upon which recovery is based
of March 3, 1974, 427 F. Supp. 701, 70S (C.D. Cal. 1977).
3,S. See supra note 30.
39. See note 44 intro., and text accompanying, for the purposes of allowing the recovery of punitive damages.
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within the protection accorded fundamental rights. 40 The court, therefore, relied on the more recent equal protection test applied in sex
discrimination cases.4 1
The Paris Air Crash court noted that wrongful death claimants
constitute a class which is denied the right to recover punitive damages, while the right to recover punitive damages is granted by
statute to all other tort claimants. 42 The state objectives put forth
in defense of the unequal treatment were that it protects against
excessive recoveries, discourages marginal litigation, and encourages
43
realistic settlements.
The purposes of allowing the recovery of punitive damages are
to punish the tortfeasor and to deter others from similar outrageous
conduct. 4 4 The recovery of punitive 'damages turns on the gravity of
the tortfeasor's conduct rather than on the right to compensation.
Thus, punitive damages should be recovered on the basis of malicious
conduct alone, not the nature of the resulting harm.4 5 If punitive
40. In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 427 F. Supp. 701, 708 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
The personal right of such protection belongs to the wrongful death claimant as a member of the public, which is separate and distinct from the decedent's rights and privileges.
rd. at n. 14.
41. Id. at 708.
42. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3294 (West 1970) (emphasis added) provides as follows:
In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract,
where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.
North Dakota has a similar statute, derived from the California provision, which
provides for punitive damages in order to punish the defendant and to provide an example.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-07 (1976).
43. In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 427 F. Supp. 701, 705-06 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
44. id. at 706. See supra note 42, and statute quoted therein. This is the position taken
by the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 908 (1939), and is. also the majority view. See 22 AM.
JUR. 2d, Damages § 237 (1965). Damages for loss of companionship, solatium, and' mental
suffering are denied in wrongful death actions in various jurisdictions. They are different
from punitive damages because they are compensatory, and thus vary according to the
injury. Such damages could be excessive in death cases. Therefore, this equal protection
argument is applicable only to punitive damages which are awarded solely as punishment
and deterrence, not compensation. In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 427 F. SupP.
701, 706 n. 10 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
Of those jurisdictions- which deny punitive damages in, wrongful death actions, and
allow them In other tort actions, only Michigan and Georgia base the recovery of punitive
damages on a theory of compensation, or mixed comnensation and deterrence. See, e.g.,
Oppenhuizen v. Wennersten, 2 Mich. App. 288, 139 N.W.2d 765 (1966); GA. CODE ANN. 8
105-2002 (1968).
45. In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 427 F. Supp. 701, 707 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
An example used by the court, as quoted from In re Paris Air Crash of March 3,
1974, 410 F. Supp. 326 (C.D. Cal. 1976), illustrates the irrationality of denying exemplary
damages in wrongful death actions.
Assume a 14-year-old boy was taking his goat to the county fair to win
a prize, in a brand new station wagon, driven by his father, in which his
mother was also riding; assume further that at an intersection with a green
light in their favor, a car driven by a man who was being followed by the
police, who had given him the signal to stop, willfully, wantonly, and maliciously drove through the red light at 80 miles an hour, hit the station
wagon broadside, killing the father and the mother, breaking all four legs
of the goat, completely demolishing the station wagon, and cutting off two
fingers of one of the boy's hands.
id. at 328.
In most jurisdictions, punitive damages would be allowed for all the injuries except for the death of the boy's parents, even though the same reckless conduct caused all
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damages are to serve their purpose, their recovery should be allowed in all tort actions where malicious conduct is involved. Denying the recovery of punitive damages in wrongful death actions where

the death is the result of malicious conduct does not in any. way
further the state's purposes in allowing the recovery of punitive
damages in gerleral, the punishment of the tortfeasor and the de46
terrence of similar conduct.

The Paris Air Crash court found no evidence that allowing the
recovery of punitive damages in wrongful death actions would result
in more excessive recoveries than in personal injury or property actions. 47 The recovery of punitive damages, being based upon outrageous conduct, varies in amount according to the degree of severity
of the conduct, not the degree of compensation which should be
awarded to wrongful death claimants. 4 In this particular case, total
verdicts may be large because of the many deaths, not because the
actions brought were wrongful death actions. "Any measure of punitive damages must be made by comparison of one death to one personal injury. The balance must involve defendants of equal wealth
and guilty of identical oppression, fraud, or malice. So measured, the
rationality of the discriminatory classification attempted here disappears." 49
In determining whether the denial of punitive damages violates
the United States Constitution, it is apparent that there is no substantial relationship between denying the recovery of punitive damages in wrongful death cases and avoiding excessive recoveries.5°
the injuries, Including the deaths. Id. This Is so despite the fact that It is the oppressive
conduct which is to be punished regardless of the type of compensation sought by the
plaintiff. See In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 427 F. Supp. 701, 707 (C.D. Cal.
1977).
46. In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 427 F. Supp. 701, 707 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
47. Id.
This is not to say that the theory of punitive damags is without flaw. See
8upra note 17. However, even though one can perhaps validly argue that punitive damages
serve as little more than a windfall to the plaintiff, the court said only that once they have
been allowed for other tort actions, no more harm will be done by allowing them for
wrongful death. 427 F. Supp. at 705.
48. In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 427 F. Supp. 701, 709 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
Many jurisdictions, however, require a showing of actual damages before punitive damages
may be awarded, e.g., McCurdy v. Hughes, 63 N.D. 435, 248 N.W. 512 (1913), and some
require that punitive damages have some relation to the amount of compensatory damages.
See Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 527 (1951). This would appear to mean not that the punitive
damages are aimed to compensate, but that they insure that the punishment bears some
relation to the harm done. And generally the harm done is indicative of how outrageous
the conduct was. Therefore if punitive damages were larger when the result waa death,
rather than only property damage, it does not mean the damages would be excessive, nor
that they were compensating for the death. It would mean only that conduct resulting in
death is more serious than conduct resulting In property damage, and thus is Oeserving of
greater punishment. See, e.g., Coats v. Constr. and Gen. Laborer's Local No. 185, 15 Cal.
App. 3d 908, 916, 93 Cal. Rptr. 639, 643 (1971), where the court said as follows: "[Tin
assessing . . . [punitive] . . . damages, . . . [the jury] . . can properly consider . . . the
nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff which the defendant caused or intended to
cause .... "
49. In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 427 F. Supp. 701, 70S (C.D. Cal. 1977).
50. Id. Had empirical data been presented to show that verdicts are or would be more
excessive in wrongful death cases than personal injury or property actions, a rational
basis for denying punitive damages would have been established, and probably a different
result would have been reached. Absent any such evidence, the court looked only at the
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111

Such damages would be no more excessive when wrongful death
claimants are seeking compensation for their pecuniary loss than if
the victim were seeking compensation for personal injury, if both
losses were caused by the same tortious conduct.5 1 Yet punitive
damages would be allowed for the personal injury action, but not
for wrongful death.52
There is also no substantial relationship between the denial of
recovery of punitive damages and the discouragement of marginal
litigations. The mere possibility of fraudulent litigation is not sufficient reason to deny the recovery of punitive damages in all wrongful death actions, for claimants in both meritorious and groundless
actions would be denied recovery. 3
The argument that denying the recovery of punitive damages in
wrongful death cases is a denial of equal protection may be even
stronger under a state constitutional equal protection provision than
under the federal constitution.5 4 It has been held in several jurisdictions that a state equal protection provision may require a more
stringent analysis than that required by the federal rational basis
test.5 3 Thus it is possible for a state action to comply with minimum
federal standards, but still be ruled unconstitutional under the state
equal protection provisions.50
North Dakota's wrongful death statute is similar to the California
statute interpreted by the court in Paris Air Crash.5 7 The damages
provision, as in the California statute, does not expressly deny punitive damages.59 The North Dakota courts, however, has interpreted
the statute to allow the jury, in estimating damages, to consider only
the pecuniary loss sustained by the decedent's kindred, thus denying
the recovery of punitive damages.5 9 Yet North Dakota provides by
legislative purpose of punitive damages. Id. at 707.

51.

Id.

52. See supra note 42 and text accompanying.
53. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, , 441 P.2d 912, 923, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 83
(1968), cited iv, In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 427 F. Supp. 701, 708 (C.D. Cal.
1977).
54. See supra note 27.
55. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, II, IS Cal. 3d 728, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 923
(1976) ; Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D. 1974).
56. E.g., Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.V .2d 771 (N.D. 1974). The state guest statute,
seen as an economic regulation, was held to deny equal protection as guaranteed by the
state constitution. The court noted that although there is a presumption of constitutionality
unless it is clearly shown otherwise, it may be prepared to use a stricter test for equal
l)rotection than are the federal courts. Id. at 776-77.
reads in part as
57. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-21-01 (1976), as amended, (Supp. 1977)
follows:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act ....
and the act . . . is such as would have entitled the party injured, if death
had not ensued, to .maintain an action and recover
damages in respect
thereof, then . . . the person who . . . would have been liable if death had
not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanling the
death of the person injured or of the tortfeasor....
an action brought
provides as follows: "In
58. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-21-02 (1976)
under the provisions of this chapter, the jury shall give such damages as it finds proportionate to the injury resulting from the death to the persons entitled to the recovery."
9
5 . Hyyti v. Smith, 67 N.D. 425, 272 N.V. 747 (1937). The court held that nothing
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statute for the recovery of punitive damages in all other tort actions,
for the express purpose of punishing the defendant.60
It thus appears that the court's reasoning in Paris Air Crash
would be applicable to a similar argument in North Dakota. It does
not. appear likely, however, that a North Dakota court would strike
down the practice of denying punitive damages for wrongful death on
federal constitutional grounds.6 1 But the North Dakota Supreme Court
has stated that although it may not strike down. a discriminatory
classification on federal grounds, the state constitution may require
the application of a stricter equal protection test.6 2 It thus appears
that the North Dakota constitution would provide a stronger basis
for the result reached in the Paris Air Crash case than would the
federal constitution.
The court in Paris Air Crash may have been incorrect in using
the equal protection test it did. It does not appear that the right to
punitive damages is akin to a recognized fundamental right to the
extent sex is akin to a suspect class.6 3 Therefore the substantial relationship test, developed as a compromise so that sex
would not be viewed as a suspect classification, should not be used in
reviewing a classification of considerably less importance. The same
result could have been reached by applying the rational basis test.
Even though that test presumes a social or economic regulation to
be constitutional, the presumption is not conclusive.6 4 An economic
or social welfare regulation will not be allowed to stand when there
is no realistic relationship between the discriminatory classification
and the state objectives alleged.65 It is doubtful that a realistic
relationship could be shown between denying the recovery of punitive damages in wrongful death actions and the alleged state objectives.
STEVEN L.

MARQUART

was to be allowed for mental suffering or solatium, and punitive damages were not recoverable unless given by the statute. Accord, Dahl v. N. Am. Creameries, Inc., 61 N.W.2d
916 (N.D. 1953).
60. See supra note 42, and statutes cited therein.
61. Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D. 1974). The court expressed disagreement
with Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 106 Cal. Rptr. 3S8, 506 P.2d 212 (1973), in which
the California court struck down their guest statute on state and federal constitutional
grounds. The court in Johnson felt that the North Dakota guest statute may have coinplied with minimum federal equal protection standards. Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d
771, 780 (N.D. 1974.).
62. Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771, 776-77 (N.D. 1974).
63. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), where a plurality of the Court
ruled that classifications based on sex contained all the characteristics of a suspect class
so as to be deserving of strict scrutiny. This is the closest the Court has come to designating sex as a suspect class. See supra note 35, and text accompanying.
64. In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 427 F. Supp. 701, 707 n. 12 (C.D. Cal.
1977). See also City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976); McGowan V.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) ; 'Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S.483,
489 (1955). Although in the above cases, the economic statutes were not struck down, the
Court justified its holdings on the ground that valid state objectives were served by the
statutes.
Yenerally
Note, Legislative
65. See Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966). See
Purpose, Rationality, mnd Equal Protection, 62 YALE L.J. 123 (1972).

